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Abstract 
 
The concept of inclusive growth is increasingly presented as offering prospects for 
more equitable social outcomes. However inclusive growth is subject to a variety of 
interpretations and lacks definitional clarity. In England, via devolution, cities are 
taking on new powers for policy domains which can influence inclusive growth 
outcomes. This opens-up opportunities for innovation to address central issues of low 
pay and poverty. This article examines the extent to which inclusive growth concerns 
form a central or peripheral aspect in this new devolution through content analysis of 
devolution agreements. It concludes that inclusive growth concerns appear to be 
largely sidelined. 
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1) Introduction 
There is increasing interest in the idea of inclusive growth as potentially offering a 
model through which the gains from economic growth can be more equitably shared. 
Internationally this interest is seen in the promotion of inclusive growth by 
organisations such as the OECD (OECD, 2015; 2016). In the UK the Royal Society 
for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) ran a high profile 
commission on inclusive growth (RSA, 2017). There has also been a proliferation of 
indicators aimed at capturing dimensions of inclusive growth in the UK and elsewhere 
(OECD, 2015; Beatty et al, 2016; Rafferty et al, 2017; Shearer et al, 2017). 
 
The concept of inclusive growth has also been taken-up at city and regional level. For 
example, in the UK, a range of cities have established ‘Fairness Commissions’, 
bringing local stakeholders together to lobby for local approaches to address 
inequality, often including through encouraging the payment of Living Wages (Lyall, 
2016). Across Europe and the US there are also examples of cities developing 
approaches towards greater inclusivity in labour markets (Green et al, 2017).  
 
The possibility of an inclusive growth focus by cities has current relevance in England 
(and the rest of the UK), with the ongoing process of devolution of powers to cities 
opening-up new opportunities. Since 2010, several cities have negotiated a series of 
City Deals, Growth Deals and Devolution Deals with central Government through 
which they have agreed the devolution of new powers and resources in policy 
domains such as transport, housing, business support, skills and employment.   
 
The benefits of devolution, and their distribution, depend on the way devolution is 
designed and the nature and scale of devolution agreements (Tomaney, 2016). The 
process of devolution to cities potentially opens-up new opportunities for them to take 
actions to improve the equity of outcomes. However, there is an important evidence 
gap around the extent to which English cities are able to utilise such opportunities to 
develop more inclusive policies. Moreover, the concept of inclusive growth is not 
clearly defined and is subject to different definitions.  
 
The extent to which cities articulate notions of inclusive growth or make the case for 
it is under-researched. This article addresses these evidence gaps by assessing the 
extent to which inclusive growth concerns appear to have been an important 
consideration of devolution agreements with English cities, and examining how cities 
frame their future plans for economic (and social) progress. To make these arguments 
the article provides new content analysis of published devolution agreements 
negotiated by central government with six large English cities in the period to the end 
of 2016. This is the period during which devolution to cities became established, so 
setting the context for ongoing developments. The article focuses particularly on 
issues of employment: a central concern of inclusive growth strategies.  
 
In assessing devolution agreements this article contributes to academic and policy 
debates on devolution, deal making and inclusive growth, with a novel feature being 
the application of a ‘good jobs framework’ to assess the nature of approaches to 
inclusive growth. The ‘good jobs framework’ (Osterman, 2008) is way of assessing 
employment policy; distinguishing between efforts to create more high quality jobs 
and those seeking to improve the existing stock of jobs, as well identifying the nature 
of the mechanisms utilised to meet these aims. The article also contributes to the 
literature examining the potential for inclusive growth concerns to significantly 
influence policy development and to challenge inequalities. The experience of English 
cities described in the paper has wider international relevance for a number of 
reasons. First, given the increasing international interest in inclusive growth, the 
research provides a novel way of analysing inclusive growth through content analysis 
and through the application of the good jobs framework. Second, with cities seen as 
important actors in inclusive growth (Lee, 2018), the paper demonstrates the 
importance of the consideration of powers and power relationships between different 
levels of government and policymaking. Finally, English cities provide a case of the 
challenges for developing inclusive growth approaches which are likely to have 
strong resonance for other liberal market economies and for countries with relatively 
centralised governance systems.   
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the development of inclusive 
growth as a concept and identifies some of the challenges with defining it. Section 3 
details the process of devolution to English cities over the period from 2012 to 2016. 
Section 4 discusses the selection of cities and outlines the methods used to analyse 
city devolution and inclusive growth. Section 5 presents the analysis of the extent to 
which inclusive growth concerns are apparent in city devolution. Section 6 concludes 
and considers implications for policy.  
 
2) The concept of inclusive growth 
 
Inclusive growth is a term which is now quite frequently deployed; however it is 
rather amorphous and is subject to a range of different interpretations. As Ranieri and 
Ramos (2013; 10) surmise, inclusive growth might be best characterised as ‘an 
intuitively straightforward and yet elusive concept’. For Lee (2018; 1), the concept is 
one which is ‘conceptually fuzzy and operationally problematic’, and which may 
function more through the adaption of existing policies and practices than through the 
development of new ones. Inclusive growth can include a range of policy domains, 
although primacy is often given to labour market issues and the quantity and quality 
of work (Green et al, 2017).  
 
Particular framings of inclusive growth have important implications for the way in 
which the concept is understood. Turok (2010) distinguishes between the weighting 
which policy places on greater equality of opportunity versus greater equality of 
outcomes. He argues that inclusive growth approaches have tended to focus more on 
greater equality of opportunity, which tends to be politically easier to pursue than 
equality of outcomes because the latter is likely to rely more heavily on redistribution 
through taxation and social security systems.  
 
Setting out a useful typology, Lupton and Hughes (2016) identify a ‘Growth Plus’ 
interpretation of inclusive growth, which prioritises growth but also recognises the 
need to link individuals to newly created opportunities associated with this, largely 
through connectivity and labour market supply-side initiatives. This approach works 
with the established economic model rather than presenting a substantive departure 
from existing practices. They contrast this with an ‘Inclusive Economy’ approach 
which seeks to challenge and change elements of growth generating inequality, rather 
than mitigating their outcomes. The first approach works with the grain of existing 
neo-liberal framings, while the second represents a more radical shift towards a new 
economic model focused on the nature of growth and associated governance 
structures needed to serve the ‘wider public interest’ (Cowling & Tomlinson, 2011; 
831). 
 
The OECD (2015; 1) suggest inclusive growth can be supported by ‘win-win policies’ 
focused on macroeconomic stability, employment and skills, enterprise and 
innovation, finance, economic development, infrastructure, competition and product 
market regulation,  and public services. However there is a danger that this view 
prioritises technocratic fixes and policy tweaking, but ignores thornier questions 
around the relationship between economic growth, political power and economic 
inequality.  
 
In England the term ‘inclusive growth’ has tended not to be much used by 
policymakers, albeit language invoking it is evident. Prime Minister, Theresa May, 
for example has talked of the need ‘to make Britain a country that works not for the 
privileged few, but for every one of us’ (13 July 2017)i. In one of the nations of Great 
Britain - Scotland - the concept of inclusive growth is more explicitly acknowledged. 
The Scottish Government’s Economic Strategy (March 2015) specifies ‘promoting 
inclusive growth’ as being one of the country’s four priorities (Page 13). Scotland has 
also explicitly referenced and targeted issues of ‘Fair Work’; this is significant given 
the primacy given to issues of employment quantity and quality in most definitions of 
inclusive growth (Green et al, 2017).     
 
3) Devolution and economic development in England 
 
Historically England has been characterised by centralised policymaking and limited 
devolution of powers to sub-national areas, although in the wider UK there has been 
devolution of selected policy areas to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government (2010-2015) initiated a series of ‘deals’ 
with selected cities to devolve powers and resources in particular policy domains. The 
Conservative Government (2015-2017) extended the coverage and scope of 
devolution agreements (National Audit Office, 2016). However the transfer of powers 
has been uneven between places and in terms of policy domains under consideration 
(O’Brien &Pike, 2015). The policy narrative has focused on ‘rebalancing’ and has 
been bound up with the idea of the need for a counterweight to the concentration of 
economic activity and growth in London and the Greater South East. The context to 
devolution and a focus on spatial rebalancing is that patterns of spatially uneven 
development are deeply engrained in the UK’s economic geography (Gardiner et al, 
2013; Martin et al, 2016). 
  
The process of devolution to cities started in earnest with the agreement of a series of 
City Deals: agreements between central and local governments involving the 
devolution of negotiated new powers and resources to individual cities (Crowley et 
al., 2012). Initially these focused on the eight largest cities outside London. A second 
set of Deals were subsequently agreed with seventeen smaller cities. The Deals made 
provision for devolution focused on transport, business support and skills. On the 
back of this a series of local Growth Deals were agreed which were designed to 
address local barriers to growth. These attracted funding from a new Local Growth 
Fund.  
 
The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016) established the framework 
for further devolution and a new wave of devolution agreements. Devolution to 
English cities has also been tied to provisions for governance changes: specifically the 
establishment of directly elected Mayors.   
 
There have been a number of criticisms of the approach to devolution adopted in 
England. These relate to the processes through which devolution has been developed 
and the asymmetrical power relations between central and local governments; the 
limited nature of powers which have been devolved; the fuzziness of the devolution 
agenda and lack of a strategic approach; and, critically, the limited financial resources 
attached to devolution agreements. Each of these is discussed briefly in turn.   
 
Devolution in England has been bound-up with a process of ‘deal-making’. First, this 
means that devolution has progressed in a piecemeal and fragmented manner. Rather 
than a transparent offer of devolution of particular powers, there has been an ad hoc 
and opaque process of negotiation in private with individual cities (Ayers et al, 
2017a). Secondly, agreement of deals is subject to content being acceptable and 
agreeable to central government, including individual ministers and the Treasury 
(Tomaney, 2016). This places clear limits on the potential terrain which devolution 
might cover. 
 
More broadly, the nature of powers devolved has been constrained, and some powers 
have been centralised while simultaneously others have been devolved (Bailey & 
Wood, 2017). This raises questions about how meaningful the experience of sub-
national devolution has been (Ayers et al, 2017a; Ayers et al, 2017b). Within this 
context it has been argued that more radical and citizen-centric principles are needed 
to replace a pre-occupation with the failings of individual places (lack of 
competitiveness, skills deficits etc.) which are the current priorities of devolution 
(MacKinnon 2016; Etherington & Jones, 2016).  
 
Lee (2017) writing on the idea of a Northern Powerhouse, a concept which has 
received considerable political attention as offering an alternative to London-centric 
growth, identifies a series of issues with the development and deployment of the 
devolution and rebalancing agenda, including the lack of an over-arching strategy or 
an accountable institution.   
 
Devolution has also been accompanied by a reduction in financing of economic 
development activities in comparison to the previous iteration of regional policy 
where delivery was executed through Regional Development Agencies (Hildreth & 
Bailey, 2013; MacKinnon, 2016). While the adequacy of funding to address spatial 
inequalities is a longstanding problem (Gardiner et al, 2013), extended fiscal austerity 
in the period since 2010 has reduced local capacity to act and invest to support local 
economic development. This problem is exacerbated by prioritisation of spending on 
a new industrial strategy which prioritises a narrow range of sectors focusing on 
economic competitiveness. These sectors are often under-represented in many 
disadvantaged areas (Fothergill et al, 2017). 
 These issues highlight a disconnect between the promise of devolution to empower 
cities to set their own priorities and the reality of limits to both powers and resources 
being devolved. Both powers and resources are clearly fundamental in the extent to 
which more inclusive approaches to development can be adopted. Here, historical 
studies of power relations and governance are instructive. The literature on statecraft 
identifies the preoccupation of central government with the ‘high politics’ of policy 
associated with macroeconomic management and taxation alongside the 
‘'peripheralization' of many matters of 'low politics' to governmental agencies outside 
the centre’ (Bulpitt, 1986; 28). This framework has been applied to local English 
devolution, with the authors arguing that devolution does little to redress the 
concentration of high politics within central government, which by extension frames 
the dominant growth model and approach to economic development (Ayers et al 
2017b).  
 
The scope for changes associated with devolution towards developing a greater 
emphasis on inclusive growth can also be considered by drawing on Hall’s (1993) 
classic framework of the policy paradigm shift. Hall identified the following changes 
in policy instruments and hierarchies required to denote a policy paradigm shift: 
 First order changes – quantitative changes in rates/levels of  instruments of 
policy (instrument settings)  but instruments and goals remain the same  
 Second order changes – changes in policy instruments but not overall goals or 
hierarchy of goals 
 Paradigm shift – radical shift in instrument settings; instruments and hierarchy 
of policy goals 
We return to this framework subsequently in assessing the relationship between 
devolution and inclusive growth.  
 
4) Methods and case study cities 
 
The findings presented here are based on an analysis of the content of the published 
documentation of devolution agreements between central government and individual 
cities. All the agreements are publically available and provide details about the nature 
of approaches, powers and resources agreed, and contextual information about how 
the agreement aims to build on existing local strengths and meet local needs. The 
documents do not provide details about the negotiations themselves which are 
conducted privately between representatives from individual cities and civil servants 
negotiating on behalf of central government.  
 
The analysis of devolution is focused on agreements covering six large English cities/ 
city-regions agreed between 2012 and 2016 (although it should be noted that the 
devolution process has continued thereafter); with the main devolution agreements 
signed between 2014 and 2016 This was also a period of growing policy interest in 
inclusive growth in the UK, with the establishment of an All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Inclusive Growth (2014); high profile OECD work on advocating inclusive 
growth (2015); the focus on inclusive growth in the Scottish Government’s Economic 
Strategy (2015); and the launch of the Inclusive Growth Commission (2016). The 
rationale for selection of the cases was primarily based on their population size, 
representing the bulk of devolution to urban populations in England (outside London). 
The cases were also selected for mostly being at the vanguard of devolution, being 
amongst the first wave of City Deals and moving furthest and fastest with their 
Devolution Agreements. The agreement of devolution deals has been associated with 
changing governance structures of ‘core’ cities and their hinterlands, particularly 
through the creation of mechanisms for cooperation across neighbouring local 
authorities in a wider city-region area. The cases selected are: the West Midlands 
(including Birmingham – total population 2,834,000); Greater Manchester 
(2,756,000); Liverpool City Region (1,525,000); Leeds City Region (3,048,000); 
Sheffield City Region (1,375,000); and the Tees Valley (670,000)ii. All have a 
substantial economic history of engineering/manufacturing and have been engaged in 
a long-term process of economic restructuring. 
 
The devolution agreements reviewed are detailed in Table 1 (the references are 
provided in Appendix 1). All case studies except the Tees Valley were in the first 
wave of devolution through City Deals. All had also agreed multiple iterations of 
Growth Deals. Most had, at the time of analysis, moved from iterations of City Deals 
and Growth Deals to secure one or more fuller Devolution Agreements with central 
government (details of these are provided in the subsequent section). One case, Leeds, 
had not reached the point of a main devolution agreement with central government, 
whilst Manchester had agreed multiple iterations. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The documents were reviewed using a template to detail information about how cities 
had framed their overall approaches to economy and society, the content of the 
devolution agreements and how this aligned to particular policy domains, and the 
approaches and activities targeting employment within the agreements.  
 
Content analysis was also used to assess the prevalence of particular key terms within 
the text of documents. The aim of this was to get a measure of the extent to which 
economic and/or social development aims were embedded in those agreements. Key 
terms were developed to capture growth and elements of economic development, and 
to measure references to some of the major social challenges which might be tackled 
as part of an inclusive growth agenda. The search terms used were:  
 
 Inclusion/ive (social/economic)  Growth 
 Social  Competitive/ness 
 Fair (society, outcomes)  Profit 
 Low-pay  Enterprise  
 Unemployment  Innovation/ive/ate 
 Justice (social)  Technology/ical 
 Well-being  Productivity/ive  
 ‘Good jobs’  
 
The search terms were counted across all devolution agreements for each city. They 
were not counted where they were used as a proper noun, referring to, for example, 
the Regional Growth Fund or Local Enterprise Partnership. For nouns like ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘justice’ and the adjective ‘fair’, the words were counted when they were 
specifically referencing the concepts specified in parentheses.  
 
The recorded information on approaches to employment in the cities was then placed 
into a ‘good jobs framework’, an approach first developed by Osterman (2008) when 
analysing employment policy and practice in the US (Table 2). The framework allows 
for an assessment of the predominant approach taken to improve the quality of local 
labour markets through the range of policy tools which are available to stimulate 
change. Two axes are identified. The first distinguishes between approaches seeking 
to create more high quality jobs (i.e. ‘create more good jobs’) versus those seeking to 
improve the existing stock of jobs in the local labour market (i.e. ‘make bad jobs 
better’). The second axis identifies whether policymakers seek to utilise standard-
setting mechanisms, such as wage floors (minimum and living wages) and other 
institutional mechanisms (including unionisation), community benefit agreements 
(such as those typically associated with large developments), or financial (taxation) 
incentives; or whether they rely more on programmatic approaches such as sector-
focused programmes and/or intermediary organisations. Using the framework is an 
important innovation as across most definitions of inclusive growth elements of job 
quality are of central importance.  
 
The analysis presented draws explicitly on documents relating to City Deals, Growth 
Deals and Devolution Agreements. We find that inclusive growth concerns tend to be 
peripheral in these. It should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that 
inclusive growth issues are absent from cities’ thinking more broadly or that they do 
not feature more strongly in other policy/strategy documents; although it does 
demonstrate such concerns have played a limited role in the central planks of 
devolution.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
5) Assessing inclusive growth concerns in city devolution  
 
Policy domains in devolution agreements 
 
We start by setting-out the broad policy domains which constitute the focus of the 
main Devolution Agreements in the six case study cities (Table 3)iii. The devolution 
agreement documents for all case studies explicitly identify the broad policy domains 
of transport, housing and planning, skills, and business support. Most include some 
form of employment support. Half of the agreements also include innovation and 
public service reform. A minority of agreements explicitly identify investment funds, 
trade and exporting, energy and environmental, and health policy. 
 
The transport policy domain in most agreements is primarily concerned with road and 
rail infrastructure programmes to support economic growth. Housing and planning 
largely involves proposals to unlock sites for new housing and commercial 
development, often through land and/or housing investment fund mechanisms. Across 
the agreements the devolution of ‘skills’ is relatively generic and involves the 
devolution of the national 19 plus adult skills programme and greater influence over 
post-16 education, training and apprenticeships. The agreements emphasise skills that 
meet local employer needs for growth (i.e. they aim to be ‘demand-led’).  The process 
of devolving business support is also relatively standardised, based on localising the 
current national programme, and seeking to align the national Business Growth 
Service with local business support through local Growth Hubs. The focus is on 
growth of start-ups, supporting growth sectors, increasing exports and further 
promoting inward investment. The Tees Valley Devolution Agreement is distinct in 
proposing a (business support) programme as a response to unemployment arising 
from industrial plant closures.  Related to employment support, Greater Manchester’s 
original Devolution Agreement of November 2014 explicitly identifies ‘complex 
dependency’ as an area for action, involving an expansion of their Working Well pilot 
to help tackle long-term unemployment. However, such examples of locally-
developed initiatives are relatively rare across all of the devolution documents. 
Agreements identifying public services are primarily about public service reform.. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
How have cities framed devolution? 
 
The way in which growth and economic development is framed by cities and the 
extent to which this is linked to aims of social improvements is important in 
considering the nature of, and scope for, inclusive concerns.  From the policy domains 
and policy approaches adopted, it is clear that a growth narrative predominates across 
the devolution arrangements. Within this overall framing, the focus largely falls on 
‘barriers to growth’. These barriers are largely ascribed to a combination of a need for 
physical development to address infrastructure issues around transport and availability 
of business sites; improving skills supply through a greater local influence over 
national programmes for post-16 and 19+ adult skills provision and responding to 
employer demand; and through business support to tackle barriers to the growth of 
exports.  
 As well as these horizontal policies, particular economic sectors are highlighted in 
devolution agreements as being specific targets of policy. These tend to be high value-
added sectors. The most prominent and strongly represented economic sector across 
all of the devolution cases is advanced manufacturing (or ‘high value’ 
manufacturing). This is followed by the energy sector (Leeds, Tees Valley, Sheffield, 
Liverpool, Birmingham/West Midlands), encapsulating ‘low carbon’ energy 
generation and innovations, carbon storage, and oil and gas refinement. There is also 
some emphasis on life sciences and financial and professional services 
(Birmingham/West Midlands and Leeds in both cases).  
 
There is some limited evidence of a secondary framing around social concerns. Youth 
unemployment is one theme where several devolution agreements develop some form 
of intervention. The emphasis and aspirations are stronger in some cities than others, 
being most notable in Leeds City Region City Deal with the aspiration to be a ‘NEET 
free’ city. Critically there is little emphasis on how the economic and social elements 
of devolution are, or could be, linked together. Economic development approaches 
and interventions tend to be treated discretely from those parts of the agreements 
which focus on tackling unemployment. 
 
There is some evidence of a gradual shift towards greater emphasis on social 
development through the iterations of devolution agreements, as exemplified by 
Greater Birmingham. The Greater Birmingham City Deal was strongly focused on 
growth in advanced manufacturing (and some other high-value growth sectors). The 
language is upbeat and boosterish. This upbeat message carries forward to the later 
Devolution Agreement (including the wider Combined Authority), with this 
agreement coming at a ‘moment of great economic potential….[with the] opportunity 
to deliver significant additional economic growth and job creation’ (page 4). This 
time, however, the document also acknowledges ‘the economic and social challenges 
the region faces’ (ibid). There is further mention of ‘improving outcomes for 
individuals with multiple indicators of vulnerability (unemployment, offending, 
substance misuse, poor mental health and homelessness)’ (HM Treasury and WMCA, 
2015; 14), but little reference to the solutions to these social challenges and how 
devolution might contribute to this. 
 
Figure 1 presents findings from an analysis of document texts to provide evidence of 
the balance between economic and social concerns within devolution agreements 
(covering City Deals, Growth Deals and Devolution Agreements). This is a simple but 
insightful way of summarising the content of the documents. The results are presented 
separately for each of the case study cities. The words were selected to capture both 
economic and social elements of the devolution agreements and to help assess the 
balance between these. The reported results are a sub-set of the terms listed in Section 
4. These are representative of the full search, with a limited number reported for ease 
of presentation. The term ‘growth’ is referenced almost 200 times across the various 
devolution documents agreed with areas covered by the West Midlands Combined 
Authority. The term similarly dominates the word counts across the other cities; 
referenced 97 times by Sheffield and 90 times by Manchester. Drivers or facilitators 
of growth such as innovation and technology are present but less frequently 
referenced.  
 
By contrast there is much less emphasis on the social side. There is some concern 
with unemployment, referenced on average eleven times across cities. There are no 
specific mentions in the documents analysed of low-pay or associated issues. This is 
surprising given the ongoing national debate about low-pay, the link between low-pay 
and poverty, and the national debates about the erosion in the value of real wages 
since the 2007/08 recession. Similarly the term ‘inclusion’ is only mentioned four 
times across the documents from the six cities. In short, inclusionary concerns and 
issues of major social importance in recent years around pay and poverty are largely 
ignored in devolution.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
This is a basic analysis of the balance between economic and social concerns based on 
key words. However it is instructive in how large the gaps are between economic, 
particularly growth, and social concerns. The analysis provides ample evidence of the 
dominant growth narrative within the discourse of devolution. It suggests that rather 
than challenging the existing economic development model and the inequalities it (re) 
produces, devolution has focused primarily on barriers to growth and the pursuit of 
growth, rather than taking inclusion and broader social welfare as a point of departure. 
 
Devolution and ‘good jobs’ 
 
The nature of devolution agreements can also be assessed through the extent to which 
they focus on the quality of employment, a critical element in an inclusive growth 
agenda. Here Osterman’s framework is used as a way of assigning measures in 
devolution agreements according to the extent to which they target new growth of 
high quality jobs or the extent to which they seek to improve the stock of existing 
jobs, and whether they take a standard setting or programmatic approach. Table 4 
reports this analysis, demonstrating a dominance of approaches seeking to grow good 
jobs rather than improve existing jobs. Hence, the entire emphasis of devolution as it 
relates to employment quality appears orientated towards ‘programmatic’ approaches 
to ‘creating more good jobs’. The primary focus revolves around investment in 
physical sites combined with some emphasis on skills supply. In Greater Birmingham 
the approach is geared around development of existing strengths in advanced 
manufacturing and development of green jobs. In Liverpool there is an emphasis on 
science and developing the Knowledge Quarter. Sheffield has a greater focus on local 
skills supply tied to particular sub-sectors (glass production and high speed rail) as 
well as an economic development focus on advanced manufacturing and nuclear 
research. Tees Valley identifies oil and gas as well as wider advanced manufacturing 
and logistics. Leeds City Region is perhaps less sectorally focused, although it does 
have an emphasis on biotech and low carbon jobs. Greater Manchester identifies a 
range of sectors including advanced manufacturing, business services, bio-tech and 
pharmaceuticals. In all the cities the approaches taken can be viewed as programmatic 
in that none seek to provide any systemic change linked to some form of minimum 
thresholds. Yet all six case study city-regions have large low-wage markets which 
remain outwith the devolution conversation as captured in the documents analysed.   
 
In part the emphasis on programmatic interventions reflects how individual cities are 
constrained in their ability to influence policy in important areas of standard setting 
linked to broader job quality concerns. Core policy areas such as national minimum 
wages are not in their influence and are set nationally. Notwithstanding this, the 
complete absence of (softer) standard setting measures and any programmatic focus 
on the large bulk of low-paid employment in these areas is clearly problematic when 
trying to relate policy and practice under devolution with a focus on inclusive growth. 
There are some programmatic approaches relating to employment entry (tackling 
unemployment), but increasingly the UK’s poverty problem is associated with in-
work poverty and poor quality work rather than high rates of joblessness (Lee et al., 
2017). Devolution up to this point does not provide a direction for beginning to 
address this issue.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The sectors targeted are of particular interest, being heavily concentrated in relatively 
narrow higher value-added activities. This type of narrow sectoral targeting has been 
criticised for missing much productive capacity and concentrating the potential gains 
from growth on a narrow section of the population (Mayhew & Keep, 2014; Sissons 
& Jones, 2016; Fothergill et al, 2017). Any focus that the devolution agreements have 
on job quality improvement links solely to the creation of new jobs; there is no 
emphasis across the agreements of any engagement of policy with the bulk of the 
(low-paid) labour market.  This reading of the devolution agreements finds them to be 
narrowly pre-occupied with growth generation in specific sectors which are, for the 
most part, relatively small in employment terms. This narrow sectoral focus, 
combined with the emphasis on the creation of new jobs, neglects a large proportion 
of the labour market, and one which is critical for inclusive growth concerns – 
individuals who are in employment but who are in jobs which insecure, poorly paid 
and offer few opportunities for development. The use of Osterman’s framework 
therefore suggests that the approach to employment taken in devolution agreements is 
distinctly unbalanced.   
 
Explaining the marginality of inclusive growth concerns  
 
The analysis has demonstrated the limited nature of inclusive growth concerns in 
devolution agreements, but what explains this? In a sense, the marginalisation of 
inclusive growth reflects the inherent imbalance in the particular approach to 
devolution adopted in England. The deal-making method is fundamentally 
asymmetrical in terms of power relations, with boundaries and resources controlled by 
central government (Tomaney, 2016; Etherington & Jones, 2016). Furthermore, in the 
context of an extended period of fiscal austerity, devolution has really been the only 
means through which cities can seek to secure some additional (limited) financial 
resources. Within this context, it is unsurprising that the content of devolution 
agreements largely mirrors the priorities of the Conservative central government and 
reproduces the orientation of national policy.  This appears an important constraint on 
locally determined policies, practices and investment for more inclusive outcomes, 
and highlights the central role of the national context in framing prospects for 
inclusive growth in cities.   
 
There are however other factors which may also offer a partial explanation for the 
lack of emphasis on policies seeking to engender inclusive growth. There may be a 
gravitation towards the status-quo in economic development policy from negotiators 
on the cities’ side as well. This could stem from risk aversion, or lack of capacity and 
expertise to devise alternative approaches. Given the complex nature of defining 
inclusive growth, potential policy trade-offs, and the entrenchment of the historical 
focus on growth per se as the primary target, formulating informed and nuanced 
policy for inclusive growth is clearly more challenging than defaulting to existing 
approaches. There may also be a lag between on the one hand the increases in the 
profile of inclusive growth, both in the UK and internationally, given the ‘high-level’ 
insights of organisations driving this debate, and on the other the permeation of 
inclusive growth concerns into local and city-level policies and practices.  
 
6) Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Inclusive growth is a concept which is increasingly presented as a means of more 
fully linking economic and social progress. There is a growing interest in the 
parameters of inclusive growth internationally. Yet the concept itself is fuzzy. This 
article has addressed inclusive growth in sub-national policymaking through novel 
analysis of the content of new devolution agreements in England. 
 
The UK has historically had a highly centralised approach to policymaking. Since 
2010 there has been a process of incremental devolution of new powers primarily to 
urban areas. This includes powers in policy domains which are relevant to more 
inclusive growth outcomes. Devolution therefore potentially opens-up opportunities 
for cities to modify national policy to prioritise inclusion and social development. 
This article has assessed whether inclusive growth concerns have informed policy and 
practice in devolution in selected English cities.  This is a societally important 
question.  
 The devolution process has been fragmented and has moved at differential speeds 
across the case-study cities. Manchester moved quickly from City Deals to several 
iterations of Devolution Agreements; while progress towards further devolution 
elsewhere was slower. Notwithstanding the differential pace, there is considerable 
commonality around the policy domains which cities have targeted and the nature of 
changes which cities are targeting. The framing of the agreements across the cities 
also has obvious commonalities around the focus on growth and addressing barriers to 
growth, and in the targeting of particular priority sectors.  
 
Conceptual framings of inclusive growth have highlighted the distinction between 
greater equality of opportunity and greater equality of outcomes (Turok, 2010). There 
is little evidence within devolution settlements of significant consideration of these. 
Where there is some focus on opportunities these tend to be around labour market 
entry, particularly youth employment/unemployment. The approaches here are piece-
meal and only weakly integrated with the core focus of growth within the agreements. 
There is no real emphasis across the devolution agreements of policy or practice 
seeking to influence equity around outcomes. Other authors have identified a 
distinction between a ‘Growth Plus’ approach which prioritises growth but also seeks 
to widen the pool of opportunities locally and an ‘Inclusive Economy’ approach 
which seeks to shape economic and social development towards more inclusive 
outcomes rather than mitigate these post hoc (Lupton & Hughes, 2016). Our analysis 
provides some, although relatively weak, evidence of a ‘Growth Plus’ approach which 
is focused primarily on supply-side interventions; but scant evidence that wider 
‘Inclusive Economy’ thinking has permeated the devolution agenda.  
 Osterman’s good jobs framework allows for an analysis of the potential reach of a 
local employment and economic development approach, including influencing the 
demand-side of the labour market. The analysis presented here suggests that the 
approaches to employment and job quality in devolution examined here are quite 
unbalanced, with a dominance of approaches seeking to grow good jobs but much less 
engagement with approaches to improve the existing jobs. Extending this to look at 
types of jobs it is clear that the experience of city devolution is premised almost 
entirely on seeking to generate the growth of employment in predominantly high-
value sectors.  This primary focus on a relatively small number of high-value sectors 
can also be seen in the wider national approach to industrial strategy (HM 
Government, 2017). There is a striking lack of engagement with low-pay sectors 
which constitute a large proportion of employment across the case study cities. Given 
the concerns around low-pay, in-work poverty and wider job quality in the UK, it is 
perhaps surprising that these issues are almost entirely absent from devolution 
priorities.  Of course cities do lack many of the powerful standard setting powers 
which can improve the quality of work (such as statutory minimum wages), but there 
are a range of potential programmatic approaches which can be developed to improve 
work quality which are also absent from devolution agreements.  
 
Authors have stressed the durability of the UK growth model and policymakers 
attachment to its fundamentals even during periods of crisis (Hodson & Mabbett, 
2009; Cowling & Tomlinson, 2011). We observe this durability through devolution, 
which has done little to challenge existing inequalities. Analysis from the UK and 
elsewhere suggests that growth is not necessarily strongly linked with better outcomes 
for low-paid workers, and that context matters (Mishel et al., 2009; Lee & Sissons, 
2016). Yet inclusive growth concerns appear to be largely sidelined in the devolution 
processes as a narrative of growth (and assumption of trickle-down) prevails.  For 
inclusive growth to move beyond aspiration, political will and action are needed to 
address longstanding social problems; these are conspicuous by their absence in early 
iterations of devolution to English cities. 
 
The limited nature of inclusive growth concerns in devolution agreements in part 
reflects in-built design factors which shape the way of devolution has been 
approached in the England. The partners in ‘deal-making’ in devolution come from 
very different positions of power, with central government dictating the terms under 
which agreements can be negotiated (Tomaney, 2016; Etherington & Jones, 2016; 
Ayers et al 2017b). Under these conditions, approaches taken to economic 
development in devolution agreements have tended to mirror the priorities and 
practices of national government, where little emphasis has been placed on inclusive 
growth. The precise nature of boundary drawing and negotiability in devolution 
agreements is an important area for further research.  
 
Reflecting on Hall’s (1993) seminal work on policy paradigms our analysis uncovers 
only minor policy changes associated with devolution and the nature of economic 
development policy. The overall goals of policy, the hierarchy of policy goals (which 
are critical to signifying a shift towards inclusive growth) and the dominant framing 
within the national growth model remain largely unaltered. There have been modest 
changes in the levels of policy instruments as local areas take on greater responsibility 
for policy development in some areas, but this is combined with significant 
constraints on resources. In addition, the nature of policy instruments has retained a 
large degree of consistency with established national approaches.  
 
Our analysis does not imply that cities are not doing anything around inclusive 
growth. Many cities have in recent years held ‘Fairness Commissions’ and developed 
local approaches aimed at greater equity (for example through local Living Wage 
campaigns). Cities have also focused on issues such as weak employment prospects 
and household poverty, for example through the use of European Social Fund monies 
(Green et al, 2016). There is also some evidence that inclusive growth concerns may 
play a stronger role in other local documents, such as Strategic Economic Plans 
produced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (Crisp & Lupton, 2017). However, 
critically our work demonstrates that inclusive growth concerns do not appear to have 
been a priority of the early stages of devolution. This is significant as devolution is 
presented as an opportunity for cities to frame their own development, set their own 
priorities and to influence the alignment of resources. As this analysis has shown 
however, in practice the priorities and approaches which have been agreed have 
largely reproduced national policy orientations, with little emphasis on inclusive 
growth.  
 
There are a number of research gaps identified by the evidence we present.  The 
nature of the negotiations between cities and central government and the process of 
boundary drawing and negotiability is not well understood (for an exception see 
Ayers et al, 2017a). As trust and working relationships are established between local 
and national actors, it may be the case that cities are able to focus more on social 
development and inclusive growth and to mainstream these aims; this is an important 
area for ongoing research. Similarly, as policy influencers, such as think tanks, 
charities and societies, in the UK and internationally, increasingly promote the 
concept of inclusive growth this may also encourage a greater permeation of inclusive 
growth concerns into national and local policy-making. Changes in governance 
structures in cities, with the introduction of elected Mayors, may also give greater 
emphasis to policy making around inclusive growth concerns. There is ample scope 
for internationally comparative work seeking to understand the nature of policy 
development around inclusive growth in different national and institutional contexts. 
More broadly, there is much to be done to unpick the conceptual and empirical 
ambiguity of what inclusive growth is, and critically to identify how models of 
inclusive growth can be developed which meaningfully address long-running patterns 
of spatially and socially uneven development. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Devolution agreements covered by the analysis 
 
City Devolution agreements 
Greater 
Manchester 
• City Deal (July 2012); Growth Deals  (July 14; Jan 15; Nov 
16); Devolution Agreements (Nov 14; July 15; Nov 15; Mar 
16) 
Birmingham/ 
W Mids 
• Great Birmingham and Solihull – City Deal (July 12); Growth 
Deals (July 14; Jan 15; Nov 16) 
• Black Country – City Deal (Feb 14); Growth Deals (July 14; 
Jan 15; Nov 16) 
• Coventry and Warwickshire – City Deal (Dec 13); Growth 
Deals (July 14; Jan 15; Nov 16) 
• West Midlands Combined Authority Devolution Agreement  
(Nov 15) 
Liverpool • Liverpool City Region – City Deal (July 12); Growth Deals 
(July 14; Jan 15; Nov 16); Devolution Agreements (Nov 15, 
March 16) 
Leeds • Leeds City Region – City Deal (July 12); Growth Deals (July 
14; Jan 15) 
Sheffield • Sheffield City Region – City Deal (July 12); Growth Deals 
(July 14; Jan 15; Nov 16); Devolution Agreements (Feb 15, 
Oct 15) 
Tees Valley • Tees Valley City Region – City Deal (June 14); Growth Deals 
(July 14; Jan 15; Nov 16); Devolution Agreements (Oct 15) 
 
 
Table 2: The good jobs framework 
  Standard setting Programmatic 
Make bad 
jobs good 
 Minimum wages 
 Living wages 
 Unionisation 
 Career ladders programmes 
 Labour market intermediaries 
 Sectoral programs 
Create 
more good 
jobs 
 Community benefit 
agreements 
 Managed tax 
incentives 
 Extension services  
 Sectoral programs 
 Consortia or partnerships 
under business or union 
auspices 
Source: Osterman (2008) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Coverage of main devolution agreements across policy domains 
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Manchester            
Birmingham/W 
Mids 
           
Liverpool            
Leeds*            
Sheffield            
Tees Valley            
*Refers to the City Deal 
 
 
  
Table 4: Applying a good jobs framework to devolution agreements 
  Standard setting Programmatic 
Make 
bad jobs 
good 
  
Create 
more 
good jobs 
 Investments in sites, skills equipment for 
advanced manufacturing and other high-
value activities (Birmingham and W 
Midlands) 
 
Green Deal Accelerator to improve 
energy efficiency and generate green jobs 
(Birmingham) 
 
Harnessing science and knowledge assets 
– including at Daresbury and Liverpool 
Knowledge Quarter (Liverpool) 
 
Investment in skills infrastructure - 
including in FE, the British Glass 
Academy, National College for High 
Speed Rail at Doncaster, Skills Bank, 
improving links with business (Sheffield) 
 
Centre for Procurement based around 
Advanced Manufacturing and Nuclear 
Research Centres (Sheffield) 
 
Jobs growth target linked to economic 
improvement and some targeted activities 
in biotech and low carbon (Leeds City) 
 
Focus on industrial/commercial sites for 
high value growth sectors (advanced 
manufacturing, low carbon, oil and gas, 
digital and logistics), e.g. Materials 
Processing Institute, Teeside Advanced 
Manufacturing Park, Redcar and 
Cleveland Oil and Gas Academy (Tees 
Valley) 
 
Job creation in life sciences sector, 
science and technology, and low carbon. 
‘Airport City EZ’ focusing on advanced 
manufacturing/engineering/aerospace, 
business services, healthcare, industrial 
bio-technology, pharmaceuticals. (Greater 
Manchester). 
Source: Authors’ analysis of devolution agreements 
Figure 1: Referencing of selected economic and social terms in devolution agreement 
documents 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of devolution agreements (City Deals, Growth Deals and Devolution 
Agreements). 
The y axis represents the number of counts of specific terms across the documents analysed. (Note that 
the number of counts varies by city and the individual graphs are scaled differently in order to facilitate 
comparison between cities.) 
  
Appendix 1: Details of reviewed devolution documents 
 
 
 BCLEP (Black Country Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, February). Black 
Country City Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/city-deal-black-country 
 
 BCLEP (Black Country Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, July). Black 
Country Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398149/01_Black_Country_Growth_Deal.pdf 
 
 BCLEP (Black Country Local Enterprise Partnership) (2015, January). £24m 
Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for Black Country economy. 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399396/Black_Country_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 BCLEP (Black Country Local Enterprise Partnership) (agreed 2016, 
November – published 2017, March). Growth Deals 3 Factsheet – Black 
Country Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP). Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
597920/Black_Country_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 CWLEP (Coventry & Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership) (2013, 
December). Coventry and Warwickshire City Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
409933/CWCityDealFINAL.pdf 
 
 CWLEP (Coventry & Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, 
July). Coventry and Warwickshire Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398844/06_Coventry_and_Warwickshire_Growth_Deal.pdf 
 
 CWLEP (Coventry & Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership) (2015, 
January). £15.3m Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for the 
Coventry and Warwickshire economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399437/Coventry___Warwickshire_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 CWLEP (Coventry & Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership) (2016, 
November – published 2017, March). Growth Deals 3 Factsheet – Coventry 
and Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP). Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
597922/Coventry_and_Warwickshire_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 GB&SLEP (Greater Birmingham & Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership) 
(2012, July). Greater Birmingham: A city region powered by technological 
innovation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
221010/Greater-Birmingham-and-Solihull-LEP-City-Deal-Final.pdf 
 
 GB&SLEP (Greater Birmingham & Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership) 
(2014, July). Greater Birmingham and Solihull Growth Deal.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398853/12_Greater_Birmingham_and_Solihull_Growth_Deal.pdf 
 
 GB&SLEP (Greater Birmingham & Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership) 
(2015, January). £21.4m Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for 
Greater Birmingham & Solihull economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399374/Greater_Birmingham_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 GB&SLEP (Greater Birmingham & Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership) 
(agreed 2016, November – published 2017, March). Growth Deals 3 Factsheet 
– Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP). 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
597924/Greater_Birmingham_and_Solihull_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2012, July). Greater 
Manchester City Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
406275/Greater-Manchester-City-Deal-final_0.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2014, July). Greater 
Manchester Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398857/15_Greater_Manchester_Growth_Deal.pdf  
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2015, January). £56.6m 
Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for Greater Manchester economy 
[Greater Manchester Growth Deal January 2015]. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399385/Manchester_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (agreed 2016, November – 
published 2017, January). Growth Deals 3 – Greater Manchester. Retrieved 
from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
585213/Manchester_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2015, July). Further 
devolution to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and directly-
elected Mayor. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
443087/Greater_Manchester_Further_Devolution.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2015, November). 
Further devolution to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and 
directly-elected Mayor. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
479566/Further_devolution_manchester_nov_2015.pdf 
 
 GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2016, March). Further 
devolution to Greater Manchester Combined Authority. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
508116/Further_Devolution_to_Greater_Manchester_Combined_Authority_FI
NAL.pdf 
 
 HM Government, & Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (2016, 
March). Further Devolution to the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority 
and to the Directly Elected Mayor of the Liverpool City Region Combined 
Authority. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
508118/160314_Further_devolution_to_Liverpool_City_Region_-
_FINAL.pdf 
 
 HM Government, & Sheffield City Region Combined Authority (2015, 
February). Sheffield City Region Agreement on Devolution. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
403161/FINAL_Sheffield_City_Region_Devolution_Deal.pdf 
 
 HM Government, & Tees Valley Unlimited local enterprise partnership (2015, 
October) Tees Valley Devolution Agreement. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
470127/Tees_Valley_Devo_Deal_FINAL_formatted_v3.pdf 
 
 HM Treasury, & GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2014, 
November). Greater Manchester Agreement: devolution to the GMCA and 
transition to a directly elected mayor. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
369858/Greater_Manchester_Agreement_i.pdf 
 
 HM Treasury, & Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (2015, 
November). Liverpool City Region Devolution Agreement. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
477385/Liverpool_devolution_deal_unsigned.pdf 
 
 HM Treasury, & Sheffield City Region Combined Authority (2015, October). 
Sheffield City Region Devolution Agreement. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
466616/Sheffield_devolution_deal_October_2015_with_signatures.pdf 
 
 HM Treasury, & WMCA (West Midland Combined Authority) (2015, 
November). West Midlands Combined Authority Devolution Agreement. 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
477421/West_Midlands_devolution_deal_unsigned_final_web.pdf 
 
 LCRLEP (Liverpool City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2012, July). 
Liverpool City Region Deal with Government. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
221013/Liverpool-City-Region-Deal-final.pdf 
 
 LCRLEP (Liverpool City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, July). 
Liverpool City Region Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398866/22_Liverpool_City_Region_Growth_Deal.pdf 
 
 LCRLEP (Liverpool City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2015, 
January). £31.6m Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for the 
Liverpool City Region economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399417/Liverpool_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 LCRLEP (Liverpool City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (agreed 2016, 
November – published 2017, January Growth Deals 3 Factsheet – Liverpool 
City Region. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
585217/Liverpool_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 Leeds CRLEP (Leeds City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2012, July). 
Proposal: A Leeds City Region Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
221012/Leeds-City-Region-Deal-Document-Final.pdf 
 
 Leeds CRLEP (Leeds City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, July). 
Leeds City Region Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398863/20_Leeds_City_Region_Growth_Deal.pdf 
 
 Leeds CRLEP (Leeds City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2015, 
January). £54.6m Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for Leeds City 
Region economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399424/Leeds_City_Region.pdf  
 
 SCRLEP (Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2012, July). 
MADE in Sheffield – a deal for growth. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
221017/Sheffield-City-Deal-Final.pdf 
 
 SCRLEP (Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2014, July). 
Sheffield City Region Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398872/28_Sheffield_City_Region_Growth_Deal.pdf 
  SCRLEP (Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (2015, 
January). £30.7m Expansion of Growth Deal boosts local plan for Sheffield 
City Region economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399436/Sheffield_City_Region_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 SCRLEP (Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership) (agreed 2016, 
November – published 2017, January). Growth Deals 3 Factsheet – Sheffield 
City Region. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
585219/Sheffield_Factsheet.pdf 
 
 TVU (Tees Valley Unlimited local enterprise partnership) (2014, June). The 
Tees Valley City Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
321751/Tees_Valley_City_Deal_Document.pdf 
 
 TVU (Tees Valley Unlimited local enterprise partnership) (2014, July). Tees 
Valley Growth Deal. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
398878/34_Tees_Valley_Growth_Deal.pdf  
 
 TVU (Tees Valley Unlimited local enterprise partnership) (2015, January). 
£13.9m expansion of growth deal boosts local plan for tees valley economy. 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399423/Tees_Valley_Unltd_Factsheet.pdf  
 
 TVU (Tees Valley Unlimited local enterprise partnership) (agreed 2016, 
November – published 2017, January). Growth Deals 3 Factsheet – Tees 
Valley. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
585220/Tees_Factsheet.pdf  
 
 
[All documents were accessed between 8th and 30th May 2017] 
 
 
 
                                                          
i Although there is some tentative evidence inclusive growth is starting to enter the lexicon, it was 
mentioned (once) by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Spring Budget Speech (2017) 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/spring-budget-2017-philip-hammonds-speech)   
ii 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/
articles/populationdynamicsofukcityregionssincemid2011/2016-10-11#total-population 
iii These are the full devolution agreements rather than the iterations of City Deals and Growth Deals. 
For Leeds, which does not have a devolution agreement, the content of the City Deal is used to 
populate Table 3.  
 
 
